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WHEN LOSS OF LEGAL CUSTODY IS LIKE AN 
INDETERMINATE PRISON SENTENCE: OHIO’S ELIMINATION 
OF INDIGENT PARENTS’ RIGHT TO COURT APPOINTED 
COUNSEL IN CIVIL CUSTODY SUITS 
Renee Brunett* 
“If permanent custody is the family law equivalent of the death 
penalty in criminal cases, then legal custody is the equivalent of an 
indeterminate prison sentence.  An award of legal custody to a non-
parent is a serious matter which cannot be taken lightly.”                                           





The Supreme Court of Ohio exercises discretionary jurisdiction 
over cases that raise substantial constitutional questions or issues of 
“public or great general interest.”
2
  On June 25, 2014, the Supreme 
Court of Ohio declined to review In re B.B., a juvenile court custody 
case.
3
  Three justices dissented.
4
  Writing for the dissent, Justice 
O’Neill trumpeted, “In no other situation has this court ever held that 
a fundamental constitutional right can be infringed without triggering 
an indigent person’s right to appointed counsel.”
5
   
In In re B.B., the great-grandparents petitioned the juvenile court 
for emergency custody of minor children, B.B. and D.B., and 
 
*  Associate Member, 2014-2015 University of Cincinnati Law Review.  I would like to thank 
Professor Michael Solimine for his help in selecting this topic, pointing me in the right direction as I 
tackled my first law review submission, and assisting me on some tricky citations.  I also would like to 
thank my friend and mentor, Judge Sheila Calloway, Davidson County Juvenile Court, Nashville, 
Tennessee, for her continued encouragement and support and for modeling what it means to serve 
children and families.  I also owe a special thank you to Supreme Court of Ohio Justice Sharon Kennedy 
for consulting with me during my first draft and for reminding me to “always check the pocket parts.”  
And finally, to my mom, I continue to admire your selflessness and grit.  Thank you for making me the 
advocate I am today. 
 1. In re Keylor, No. 04 MO 02, 2005 WL 775890, at *15 (Ohio 7th Dist. Ct. App. March 30, 
2005) (DeGenaro, J., dissenting). 
 2. See, e.g., Ohio Const. Art. IV § 2(B)(2)(e); Ohio Sup. Ct. Prac. R. 5.02(A)(3); Ohio Sup. Ct. 
Prac. R. 7.01(B)(1)(d)(iii).   
 3. In re B.B., 11 N.E.3d 286 (Ohio 2014). 
 4. Id. (O’Donnell and Kennedy, J.J., dissenting) (O’Neill, J., dissenting with opinion). 
 5. Id. (O’Neill, J., dissenting).  During my November 1, 2014 telephone conversation with 
Justice Sharon Kennedy, Justice Kennedy stated that she would have heard the issues raised in In re 
B.B., because she believed them to be a matter of interest to Ohioans pursuant to Ohio Const. Art. IV 
§ 2(B)(2)(e).  Telephone Interview with Hon. Sharon Kennedy, Justice, Supreme Court of Ohio (Nov. 1, 
2014). 
1
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requested that the court terminate visitation between the children and 
their parents.
6
  In their complaints, the great-grandparents alleged 
that “the parents had sexually abused the children, had abandoned 
them, were unable to provide care and support for them, and were 
unfit parents.”
7
   
Under current Ohio statutory construction and juvenile rules of 
court,
8
 the Seneca County Court of Common Pleas determined that 
neither the parents in In re B.B.—nor their minor children—were 
entitled to appointed counsel.
9
  Because the children were not wards 
of the state,
10
 the court found that the “civil matters” exception 
specified in OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.352 applied.
11
  The 
juvenile court magistrate awarded the great-grandparents legal 
custody of both children, and the common pleas court judge adopted 
the magistrate’s recommendation.
12
  Notably, the great-grandparents 




On appeal, the parents argued that the right to court appointed 
counsel should extend to indigent parties in private action custody 
cases.
14
  While both the United States Supreme Court and the 
Supreme Court of Ohio have held that there is no absolute right to 
court appointed counsel in civil matters,
15
 both courts recently have 
 
 6. In re B.B., Nos. 13-13-36, 13-13-37, at *2 (Ohio 3d Dist. Ct. App. Feb. 3, 2014), rev. denied, 
11 N.E.3d 286 (Ohio 2014). 
 7. In re B.B., 11 N.E.3d. at 286. 
 8. See, specifically, the qualifying language of both OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.352—“If, as 
an indigent person, a party is unable to employ counsel, the party is entitled to have counsel . . . except 
in civil matters in which the juvenile court is exercising jurisdiction pursuant to division (A)(2) . . . .”—
and Ohio R. Juv. P. 4—“This rule shall not be construed to provide for a right to appointed counsel in 
cases in which that right is not otherwise provided for by constitution or statute.” (West 2014). 
 9. In re B.B., Nos. 13-13-36, 13-13-37, at *4. 
 10. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.23(A)(2) (concerning jurisdiction of the juvenile court “to 
determine the custody of any child not a ward of another court of this state”) (West 2014). 
 11. In re B.B., Nos. 13-13-36, 13-13-37, at *6-7; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.352 (West 2014) 
(“If, as an indigent person, a party is unable to employ counsel, the party is entitled to have counsel 
provided for the person pursuant to Chapter 120. of the Revised Code except in civil matters in which 
the juvenile court is exercising jurisdiction pursuant to division (A)(2) . . . of section 2151.23 of the 
Revised Code.”) (emphasis added).   
 12. In re B.B., 11 N.E.3d. at 286. 
 13. Appellant’s Mem. Supp. Jurisdiction, at 2, In re B.B., 11 N.E.3d 286 (Mar. 27, 2014), 
available at http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/pdf_viewer/pdf_viewer.aspx?pdf=743397.pdf 
 14. See, in particular, Appellants’ first Proposition of Law. Id. at 4–5, 6.  
 15. See, e.g., Lassiter v. Dept. of Soc. Servs. of Durham Cty., N.C., 452 U.S. 33 (1981) 
(recognizing that while “wise public policy [] may require that higher standards be adopted than those 
minimally tolerable under the Constitution,” under the circumstances, the trial court was not required to 
appoint counsel for appellant in termination of parental rights case); State ex rel. Asberry v. Payne, 693 
N.E.2d 796 (Ohio 1998), superseded by 2005 amendment to OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.352 (noting 
that there is no requirement under the federal Constitution that all indigent parties in a juvenile 
proceeding be provided appointed counsel).  
2
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examined that right through a fundamental fairness lens.
16
  Although 
not child custody cases, these more recent decisions should provide 
prospective guidance for Ohio courts concerning the appointment of 
counsel to indigent parties. 
This Comment examines whether Ohio courts should extend the 
right to appointed counsel to indigent parents in civil custody suits.  
Part II outlines how the United States and Ohio Supreme Courts have 
viewed the question of appointment of counsel to indigent parties in 
other civil matters.  Tracing legislative history, Part II also reveals 
that in Ohio, an indigent parent’s statutory right to appointed counsel 
was removed to reduce county and state budgets.  Part III argues that, 
despite the textual differences between legal custody and permanent 
custody, the impact realized by indigent parents in civil custody cases 
is akin to permanent removal—irrespective of the statutory label—
and runs afoul of due process and fundamental fairness.  Finally, Part 
IV concludes that a categorical elimination of an indigent party’s 
right to appointed counsel in so-called private action custody cases 
impedes meaningful access to the courts for indigent parents and 
their children.  Ohio statutory law should not be read as a complete 
bar to appointed counsel for indigent parents in civil actions.   
II. BACKGROUND 
The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution 
provides that no State shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law.”
17
  Article I, Section 16 of the 
Ohio Constitution parallels the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process 
protections.
18
  Both the United States and Ohio Supreme Courts have 
recognized a parent’s “basic civil right” to raise his or her children.
19
  
Since parents have constitutional custodial rights, any action by the 
 
 16. See Turner v. Rogers, 131 S.Ct. 2507 (2011); Liming v. Damos, 979 N.E.2d 297 (Ohio 
2012). 
 17. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 18. In re B.C., 21 N.E.3d 308, 312 (Ohio 2014).   
 19. See, e.g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (finding that the parent-child 
relationship “undeniably warrants deference and, absent a powerful countervailing interest, 
protection.”); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982) (supporting that a parent’s interest in the 
care, custody, and management of his or her child is “fundamental,” and “does not evaporate simply 
because [the parents] have not been model parents or have lost temporary custody of their child . . . .”); 
Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000) (concluding “it cannot now be doubted that the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects the fundamental right of parents to make decisions 
concerning the care, custody, and control of their children.”); In re Perales, 369 N.E.2d 1047, 1051–52 
(Ohio 1977) (describing a parent’s right to the custody of his or her child as “paramount.”); In re 
Murray, 556 N.E.2d 1169, 1171 (Ohio 1990) (recognizing that the right to raise a child is an “essential” 
and “basic civil right.”) (quoting Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972)). 
3
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state that affects this parental right, such as granting custody of a 




In 1981, the United States Supreme Court held in Lassiter v. Dept. 
of Social Services of Durham Cty., N.C.
21
 that the Constitution does 
not require courts to appoint counsel for indigent parents in all 
termination of parental rights proceedings.
22
  According to the 
Lassiter majority, there is a presumption of a right to court appointed 
counsel only where loss of one’s physical liberty is at stake.
23
  Yet, 
under Lassiter, even when confinement is a possibility in a civil case, 
a court must balance the strength of the litigant’s interest, the risk of 
error, and the state’s interest to determine whether the court should 
appoint counsel.
24
  Applying these balancing factors, the Lassiter 
Court recognized that “the State shares with the parent an interest in a 
correct decision, [and] has a relatively weak pecuniary interest” in 
avoiding the expense of court appointed counsel.
25
  However, as 
reasoned by the majority, the failure to appoint counsel does not 
presumptively deny a parent of constitutional rights where the 
presence of counsel could not have made a determinative 
difference.
26
   
Twenty years after Lassiter, the United States Supreme Court held 
in Turner v. Rogers that the State is not automatically required “to 
provide counsel at civil contempt proceedings to an indigent 
noncustodial parent who is subject to a child support order, even if 
that individual faces incarceration.”
27
  The Court further found that a 
State meets due process requirements when it provides “alternative 
procedural safeguards.”
28
  The Turner Court, however, ultimately 
determined that the defendant “received neither counsel nor the 
benefit of alternative procedures.”
29
  The defendant’s incarceration 
thus violated due process.   
 
 20. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 754 (1982); In re Adoption of Mays, 507 N.E.2d 453, 
456 (Ohio Ct. App. 1986). 
 21. 452 U.S. 18 (1981). 
 22. Id. at 31. 
 23. Id. at 26–27. 
 24. Id. at 27 (referencing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).   
 25. Id. at 19, 31 (emphasis added). 
 26. Id. at 33.  
 27. 131 S.Ct. 2507, 2510, 2520 (2011). 
 28. Id. at 2520 (finding that due process “does not require the provision of counsel where the 
opposing parent or other custodian . . .  is not represented by counsel and the State provides alternative 
procedural safeguards . . . .”). 
 29. Id. (listing alternate procedures as “adequate notice of the importance of ability to pay, fair 
opportunity to present, and to dispute, relevant information, and court findings.”) 
4
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A. Modifications to Ohio’s Juvenile Law 
The Supreme Court of Ohio last interpreted the bounds of the 
appointment of counsel in civil custody suits in 1998 when it decided 
State ex rel. Asberry v. Payne.
30
  In Asberry, the court held that the 
plain language of Ohio’s “right to counsel” statute
31
 provided that 
“indigent children, parents, custodians, or other persons in loco 
parentis were entitled to appointed counsel in all juvenile 
proceedings.”
32
  The court determined that a grandmother, who had 
cared for and supported her grandchild for several years,
33
 satisfied 
the definition of in loco parentis
34
 and thus qualified for court 
appointed counsel as a party to the proceeding.
35
  Despite a previous 
amendment to the juvenile rules of procedure concerning assistance 
of counsel,
36
 the court clarified that the grandmother’s right to 
appointed counsel clearly emanated from statute, and, under the 




The right to counsel statute,
38
 however, was amended in 2005 
specifically to “remove[] an indigent person’s right to appointed 
counsel in certain civil proceedings in juvenile court.”
 39
  Now, when 
 
 30. 693 N.E.2d 794 (Ohio 1998), superseded by 2005 amendment to OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 2151.352.  See H.R. 66, 126th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2005) discussed infra, at notes 42, 44, 
and accompanying text.  
 31. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.352. 
 32. Asberry, 693 N.E.2d. at 798 (emphasis added).   
 33. Id. at 795. 
 34. Id. at 798 n.2 (stating that “[a] person in loco parentis assumes the same duties as a guardian 
or custodian, although not through a legal proceeding.”); see also Black’s Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009) 
(defining in loco parentis as “in the place of a parent . . . [o]f, relating to, or acting as a temporary 
guardian or caretaker of a child, taking on all or some of the responsibilities of a parent.”). 
 35. Id. at 798. 
 36. Id.  See also qualifying sentence added to Ohio R. Juv. P. 4(A) in 1994 (“This rule shall not 
be construed to provide a right to appointed counsel in cases in which that right is not otherwise 
provided for by constitution or statute.”). 
 37. Asberry, 693 N.E.2d. at 798, 799. 
 38. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.352. 
 39. See In re M.E.H., No. 08CA4, 2008 WL 2766107, at *3 n.1 (Ohio 4th Dist. Ct. App. July 10, 
2008) (“We acknowledge that State ex rel. Asberry v. Payne . . . required a trial court to appoint counsel 
in a similar situation.  However, after Payne, the legislature amended R.C. 2151.352, which now limits 
the right to counsel at government expense.  See House Bill. 66.”)  House Bill 66 modified an indigent 
party’s right to appointed counsel in 2005.  In In re B.B., however, the Third District string cites to a 
case, In re D.J.M., which incorrectly references January 1, 2002 as the date the statute changed.  In re 
B.B., Nos. 13-13-36, 13-13-37, at 7 (Ohio 3d Dist. Ct. App. Feb. 3, 2014), review denied, 11 N.E.3d 286 
(Ohio 2014); see also In re D.J.M., 2011-L-022, 2011 WL 6938427, at *6 (Ohio 11th Dist. Ct. App. 
Dec. 30, 2011) (finding that "[t]he statute has since been amended, effective January 1, 2002, [sic] to 
specify that the right to appointed counsel for indigent parties at government expense does not apply to 
civil custody matters filed under R.C. 2151.23(A)(2)”).  A close look at legislative history reveals that a 
Senate Bill enacted in 2002—S. 179, 123rd Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2002), available at 
http://archives.legislature.state.oh.us/BillText123/123_SB_179_ENR.pdf—simply modified the 
5
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a proceeding is initiated for legal custody of a child who is not a ward 
of the state,
40
 it is treated as a “civil matter,”
 41
 excepted from any 
entitlement to appointed counsel. 
B. Counting the Costs: Why Limit Indigent Ohioans’ Right to 
Appointed Counsel in Civil Matters? 
Ohio’s Amended Substitute House Bill 66 (H.B. 66),42 labeled a 
“Budget Bill,”43 specifically removed, “[f]or certain civil matters 
only, . . . an indigent person’s [statutory] right to appointed counsel 
when the person is a party to a proceeding in juvenile court.”44  H.B. 66 
adjusted Ohio’s main operating budget and implemented certain budget 
cuts for the fiscal year 2006 to 2007.45  Interestingly, the bill, as 
introduced, did not contemplate eliminating an indigent party’s right to 
appointed counsel.46  Nonetheless, after the Ohio General Assembly 
enacted H.B. 66, the lens for approving counsel for indigent parties in 
civil custody suits shifted from fundamental fairness to fiscal 
 
language of OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.352 to make the statute gender neutral.  See S. 179, 123rd 
Gen. Assemb., at 78.  Thus, despite the court’s assertions in In re D.J.M., an indigent party’s right to 
court appointed counsel in juvenile court proceedings remained intact until 2005.  The source of the 
court’s error may be linked to a curious reference found in a 2002 Sixth District appellate court opinion 
concerning visitation.  See In re Bobbi Jo S. v. Jeff W.C., No. L–01–1252, 2002 WL 360675 (Ohio 6th 
Dist. Ct. App. Mar. 8, 2002) (finding that although the right to court appointed counsel for indigent 
parties in juvenile court cases was recognized by the Ohio Supreme Court in Asberry, the controlling 
“statute has since been amended, effective January 1, 2002, to specify that the right to appointed counsel 
. . . is now limited . . . .”).  The court in In re D.J.M. pin cites to the Bobbi Jo opinion to bolster its 
stance that the “appellant was therefore not entitled to appointed counsel.”  In re D.J.M., 2011 WL 
6938427, at *6.  Importantly, the court in In re D.J.M. mischaracterizes the holding of In re Bobbi Jo.  
Despite the misinterpretation found in In re Bobbi Jo concerning the amendment to Ohioans’ statutory 
right to counsel, the Bobbi Jo court actually held that “the child was clearly entitled to an appointed 
attorney under the law then in effect.”  In re Bobbi Jo, 2002 WL 360675, at *2 (emphasis added).  Thus, 
the Third District court’s string cite list of authorities, In re B.B., Ohio 3d Dist. Ct. App. at *7, contains 
procedural and factual errors.   
 40. Pursuant to OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.23(A)(2) (West 2014). 
 41. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.352, which governs the right to counsel in juvenile 
proceedings, now provides: 
A child, the child’s parents or custodian, or any other person in loco parentis of the child is 
entitled to representation by legal counsel at all stages of the proceedings under this chapter or 
Chapter 2152. of the Revised Code. If, as an indigent person, a party is unable to employ 
counsel, the party is entitled to have counsel provided for the person pursuant to Chapter 120. of 
the Revised Code except in civil matters in which the juvenile court is exercising jurisdiction 
pursuant to division (A)(2) . . . of section 2151.23 of the Revised Code.  (emphasis added). 
 42. H.R. 66, 126th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2005).  
 43. OHIO 126TH GEN. ASSEMB., JOURNAL 2 (2005-2006), available at 
http://www.sos.state.oh.us/sos/upload/records/journal/acts_126.pdf. 
 44. OHIO LEGIS. SERV. COMM’N, FINAL ANALYSIS 415 (2005), available at 
http://www.lsc.state.oh.us/analyses126/05-hb66-126.pdf. 
 45. See OHIO LEGIS. SERV. COMM’N, FINAL STATUS REP. OF LEGIS. 2 (May 4, 2007).   
 46. To track the changes from when the bill was introduced, passed, and enacted, see OHIO 
LEGIS. SERV. COMM’N, FINAL COMPARISON DOC. 746 (Sep. 27, 2005).   
6
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constraint.47 
The projected fiscal effect of H.B. 66 reads as follows: 
Fiscal effect: As a result of the provision’s restriction on the use of 
appointed counsel in certain juvenile court matters, theoretically at 
least, (1) counties may realize a decrease in the amount of money 
spent annually on legal assistance, and (2) the state may realize a 
decrease in the amount of money that it reimburses counties 
annually for the provision of indigent defense legal services.48 
This fiscal analysis is puzzling in light of a contemporaneous task 
force appointed by former Supreme Court of Ohio Chief Justice, 
Thomas J. Moyer, “to examine indigent and pro se legal 
representation . . . [and] ensure that Ohio citizens who cannot afford 
to . . . hire an attorney have the same fair and equal access to the court 
system as those with representation.”49   
Curiously, in April 2006—a year after H.B. 66 took effect—the task 
force released its report and recommended that funding be increased for 
civil legal representation, not stymied.50  The report pointed out that 
“civil indigent representation in Ohio is seriously under-funded” and 
acknowledged that “adequate representation of indigent persons in civil 
proceedings, although not constitutionally mandated, is a matter of 
substantial interest to the people of Ohio.51  Importantly, the task force 
further found representation “of indigent Ohioans in civil 
disputes . . . critical to the fair administration of justice [in assuring] that 
indigent persons have meaningful access to the courts . . . .”52  The task 
force concluded that substantial additional funding was needed “to 
provide legal assistance to all indigent Ohioans involved in civil legal 
matters.”53   
Four months later, an American Bar Association (ABA) task force 
also recommended that indigent litigants be appointed counsel in civil 
 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Office of Pub. Info., Moyer Appoints Task Force to Examine Indigent and Pro Se Legal 
Representation, SUP. CT. & JUD. SYS. NEWS, May 13, 2004, available at 
http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/PIO/news/2004/indigent_051304.asp. 
 50. HON. JOHN ADKINS, CHAIR, REPORT & RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT TASK 
FORCE ON PRO SE & INDIGENT LITIGANTS 36 (Apr. 2006), available at 
http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/Publications/prose/report_april06.pdf. 
 51. Id. at 36-37 (emphasis added); see also Ohio Const. Art. IV § 2(B)(2)(e); Ohio Sup. Ct. Prac. 
R. 5.02(A)(3); Ohio Sup. Ct. Prac. R. 7.01(B)(1)(d)(iii). 
 52. ADKINS, supra note 50, at 37. 
 53. Id. (emphasis added).  The report did not address the 126th General Assembly’s recent 
legislation excluding certain Ohioans from court appointed legal assistance.   
7
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matters.54  The ABA “urge[d] federal, state, and territorial governments 
to provide legal counsel as a matter of right at public expense to low 
income persons in those categories of adversarial proceedings where 
basic human needs are at stake, such as those involving shelter, 
sustenance, safety, health or child custody.”55   
More recently, Supreme Court of Ohio Chief Justice, Maureen 
O’Connor, has stated that “[a]ccess to justice should be an essential part 
of any state’s legal system and the need to meet that goal has only 
increased in [] times of economic stress.”56  Yet, despite documented 
national and local concern, Ohio eliminated the right to appointed 
counsel for indigent persons in certain child custody cases and never 
reinstituted it.   
C. The Genesis of Ohio’s Restricted Right to Appointed Counsel 
Prior to Ohio’s statutory elimination of an indigent party’s right to 
appointed counsel in certain juvenile court proceedings, the Supreme 
Court of Ohio proposed a controversial amendment to the juvenile 
rule concerning assistance of counsel.
57
  The existing rule provided, 
in relevant part, that “[e]very party shall have the right to be 
represented by counsel and every child, parent, custodian, or other 
person in loco parentis the right to appointed counsel if indigent.”
58
  
The Supreme Court, however, sought to abrogate an indigent party’s 
right to court appointed counsel in cases concerning “custody, 
visitation, and modification of child support” and in “so-called 
‘private’ child abuse, neglect or dependency actions.”
59
  In response, 
Representative David Hartley initiated House Concurrent Resolution 
38 to “disapprove the proposed amendments to the Ohio Rules of 
Juvenile Procedure.”
60
   
During committee meetings, members of the Ohio State Legal 
Services Association and Ohio Public Defenders Commission 
 
 54. HON. HOWARD H. DANA, JR., CHAIR, AM. BAR ASS’N TASK FORCE ON ACCESS TO CIVIL 
JUSTICE, 112A REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES 1, 17 (Aug. 2006), available at 
http://www.legalaidnc.org/Public/Participate/community/ABA_Resolution_onehundredtwelvea[1].pdf. 
 55. Id. at 1 (emphasis added). 
 56. Barbara Peck, Access Crisis: Ohio and Other States Struggle to Provide Liberty and Justice 
for All, ALL RISE, OHIO ST. UNIV. MORITZ COLLEGE OF LAW MAGAZINE 46, 47 (Summer 2013), 
available at http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/news/allrise/2013/07/access-crisis-ohio-and-other-states-struggle-
to-provide-liberty-and-justice-for-all/. 
 57. See generally PAUL C. GIANNELLI & PATRICIA YEOMANS SALVADOR, OHIO JUV. L. § 40:3 
(West 2014) (outlining the genesis of the 1994 amendment to Ohio R. Juv. P. 4(A)); see also HOUSE 
CIVIL & COMMERCIAL LAW COMM., H.R. CON. R. 38 COMM. REP. (Mar. 22, 1994), available at 
http://www.rotundacollection.com/Hannah/Report_CommitteeReport.aspx?id=108&ps=true&HL=True. 
 58. Ohio R. Juv. P. 4(A). 
 59. GIANNELLI & YEOMANS, supra note 57. 
 60. H.R. Con. Res. 38, 120th Gen. Assemb. (Ohio 1994). 
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strongly opposed the proposed rule amendment.
61
  Attorney Michael 
Smalz, for example, challenged the new rule as “giv[ing] the court 
too much authority to deny a clear right to counsel.”
62
  He further 
challenged the rule as a “major step backwards” from Ohio’s “effort 
to provide legal services to the poor.”
63
  Other commenters also 
vigorously attacked the proposed amendment during the rule change 
public comment period as limiting the right to appointed counsel for 
indigent persons.
64
  The court, in response, withdrew its proposal and 
substituted it with an amendment, subsequently accepted by the Ohio 
House of Representatives Civil & Commercial Law committee.
65
  
The substituted language of the juvenile rule retained the rule’s 
previous language concerning court appointed counsel, but added a 
qualifying sentence, which—as enacted—reads: “This rule shall not 
be construed to provide a right to appointed counsel in cases in which 
that right is not otherwise provided for by constitution or statute.”
66
  
The accompanying Staff Note indicates that this sentence was added 
“to clarify that Juv. R. 4 does not create a right to court-appointed 
counsel, and that the right to appointed counsel arises from other 
sources of law.”
67
  Ohio courts, therefore, are left to decide whether 
and what “other sources of law extend the right to appointed counsel 
in [] juvenile court proceedings.”
68
 
D. Applying “Other Sources of Law”: Are Any Doors Open? 
In Liming v. Damos,
69 
the Supreme Court of Ohio held that the due 
process clauses of the Ohio and United States Constitutions did not 
mandate appointment of counsel for an indigent parent at a purge 
 
 61. See HOUSE CIVIL & COMMERCIAL LAW COMM., H.R. CON. R. 38 COMM. REPS.                                                                




True.  In contrast to the fiscal constraint proposed in the 2005 budget bill limiting a right to court 
appointed counsel in certain juvenile court matters, see text accompanying notes 47 and 48, supra, the 
Ohio Public Defenders Office—opposing Ohio R. Juv. P. 4(A)’s proposed amendment—presented 
testimony that private custody actions “are a small part of the caseload and wouldn’t be a financial 
burden.”  HOUSE CIVIL & COMMERCIAL LAW COMM. at Mar. 22, 1994 report. 
 62. HOUSE CIVIL & COMMERCIAL LAW COMM., at March 15, 1994 report.   
 63. Id. 
 64. Id.  See also GIANNELLI & YEOMANS, supra note 57. 
 65. See GIANNELLI & YEOMANS, supra note 57; HOUSE CIVIL & COMMERCIAL LAW COMM., 
supra note 61, at May 24, 1994 report. 
 66. Ohio R. Juv. P. 4(A) (emphasis added).  See also GIANNELLI & YEOMANS, supra note 57. 
 67. See Ohio R. Juv. P. 4(A); GIANNELLI & YEOMANS, supra note 57. 
 68. GIANNELLI & YEOMANS, supra note 57 (internal quotation marks omitted).   
 69. 979 N.E.2d 297 (Ohio 2012).  
9
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hearing
70
 for failure to pay child support, “when that parent was 
previously represented by counsel at the originating civil-contempt 
proceeding.”
71
  Although appellant faced possible incarceration, the 
court nevertheless determined that the matter stemmed from the 
original civil contempt proceeding, and, therefore, due process did 
not require that the court provide counsel in civil matters.
72
   
Conversely, in 2013, the Supreme Court of Ohio decided State ex 
rel. McQueen v. Cuyahoga Cty. Court of Common Pleas, Probate 
Division and found that the right to appointed counsel extended to 
indigent parties in guardianship review hearings.
73
  The court 
acknowledged that, while no absolute right to counsel exists in civil 
litigation, the Ohio legislature may provide an indigent party with 
such right.
74
  Based on the plain language of the statutes governing 
guardianship proceedings, the court found that the hearing 
requirements concerning guardianship appointments extended to and 
provided for appointment of counsel at review hearings.
75
   
On October 16, 2014, the Supreme Court of Ohio decided another 
matter concerning an indigent party’s rights—this time in the context 
of custody proceedings.
76
  In In re B.C., the court ruled that a parent 
is not entitled to file a delayed appeal contesting termination of his or 
her parental rights.
77
  The Court acknowledged that “[t]he 
fundamental requisites of due process of law in any proceeding are 
notice and the opportunity to be heard.”
78
  However, because 
appellant had voluntarily appeared before the court, surrendered her 
parental rights, and, moreover, was represented by counsel during the 
termination proceedings, the court found that sufficient procedural 
safeguards existed and ensured that the appellant’s termination 




 70. Id. at 299, 306 (defining a purge hearing as “a hearing to determine whether a contemnor has 
purged himself of [his previous] civil contempt” by complying with the court’s conditions).  See also 
Black’s Law Dictionary (WestlawNext 2014) (defining “purge” as “[t]o exonerate (oneself or another) 
of guilt <the judge purged the defendant of contempt>.”). 
 71. Liming, 979 N.E.2d at 306. 
 72. Id. at 299. 
 73. 986 N.E.2d 925, 931 (Ohio 2013). 
 74. Id. at 928 (citing State ex rel. Asberry v. Payne, 693 N.E.2d 794 (Ohio 1998) to illustrate that 
the right to court appointed counsel in juvenile court custody cases existed pursuant to Ohio Revised 
Code prior to its amendment). 
 75. Id. at 929-30. 
 76. In re B.C., 21 N.E.3d 308 (Ohio 2014).   
 77. Id. at 309, 315.   
 78. Id. at 312.   
 79. Id. at 312, 315.   
10
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III. DISCUSSION 
Because complete termination of a parent’s rights over the custody 
and care of his or her child “has been described as the family law 
equivalent of the death penalty in a criminal case,”
80
 parents, 
therefore, “must be afforded every procedural and substantive 
protection [that] the law allows.”
81
  Although In re B.B. involves 
something less than the permanent termination of parental rights, 
both parents were indigent parties to the custody removal hearing, 
and their fundamental right to the care and custody of their children 
was impacted by the magistrate’s refusal to appoint them counsel. 
A. Right to Counsel, but No Right to Appointed Counsel 
Ohio statutory law
82
 provides that an indigent party is entitled to 
counsel, but also qualifies that entitlement with enumerated 
exceptions to restrict the right to appointed counsel when a juvenile 
court exercises its jurisdiction in civil matters.
83
  As applied to In re 
B.B., the great-grandparents petitioned the court for emergency 
custody of B.B. and D.B.
84
  The court informed the parents of their 
right to representation,
85
 however denied the parents a right to an 
appointed attorney.
86
  The court explained that Ohio statutory law 
limits an indigent party’s entitlement to appointed counsel in certain 
civil matters before the juvenile court.
87
  After the parents failed to 
retain a lawyer, the court cautioned that they would be proceeding 
pro se.
88
   
The great-grandparents, through hired counsel, filed sworn 
statements that both parents had abandoned the kids, “were unable to 
provide [for their] care and support, and were unfit parents.”
89
  The 
great-grandparents subsequently filed amended complaints alleging 
 
 80. Id. at 313 (citing In re Smith, 601 N.E.2d 45, 55 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991) (internal quotation 
marks omitted)).   
 81. Id.  
 82. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.352. 
 83. See OHIO LEGIS. SERV. COMM’N, FINAL ANALYSIS, supra note 44, at 415 (“[I]f the party is 
indigent, the party is not entitled to appointed counsel in a civil matter if the court is exercising 
jurisdiction pursuant to one of the following bases listed in R.C. 2151.23(A)(2), (3), (9), (10), (11), (12), 
or (13); (B)(2) through (6); (C); (D); or (F)(1) or (2) . . . To determine the custody of any child not a 
ward of another Ohio court . . . .”). 
 84. In re B.B., Nos. 13-13-36, 13-13-37, at *2 (Ohio 3d Dist. Ct. App. Feb. 3, 2014), rev. denied, 
11 N.E.3d 286 (Ohio 2014).  
 85. Id.; see also OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.352 and Ohio R. Juv. P. 4(A). 
 86. In re B.B., Nos. 13-13-36, 13-13-37, at *2. 
 87. Id.; see also OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.352. 
 88. In re B.B., Nos. 13-13-36, 13-13-37, at *3. 
 89. Id. at *2. 
11
Brunett: When Loss of Legal Custody Is Like an Indeterminate Prison Senten
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2015
1434 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [VOL. 83 
sexual abuse and failure to protect.
90
  The Third District strictly 
construed the limiting language of Ohio R. Juv. P. 4(A)’s assistance 
of counsel
91
 in conjunction with OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.352’s 
right to counsel
92
 when denying B.B.’s and D.B.’s parents court 
appointed representation.  However, in light of the statutory 
definitions of dependency, abuse, and neglect,
93
 coupled with the 
allegations of abuse, sexual abuse, and abandonment embedded in 
the great-grandparents’ complaints,
94
 the juvenile court could have—
and, arguably, should have—appointed counsel for the parents, as 
well as a guardian ad litem to represent the best interests of the 
children.
95
  Indeed, Chapter 2151 of the Ohio Revised Code outlines 
procedures for cases involving juveniles, including custody hearings, 
and directs courts to interpret the chapter’s provisions liberally.
96
  
The statute further mandates that judicial procedures must ensure that 
the parties receive a fair hearing, in which “constitutional and other 
legal rights are recognized and enforced.”
97
  Justice O’Donnell’s 
dissent in Liming captures the same sentiment:  “Assuming 
indigency . . . the court violated Liming’s right to procedural due 
process when it denied his request for appointed counsel.”
98
  
Although the Ohio General Assembly expressly “limit[ed] the 
right to counsel at government expense,”
99
 this limitation should not 
foreclose the possibility that fundamental fairness—“the touchstone 
of due process”—might require the appointment of counsel under 
certain circumstances.
100
  Notably, the Liming majority recognized 
 
 90. Id. 
 91. Ohio R. Juv. P. 4(A) (qualifying that “[t]his rule shall not be construed to provide for a right 
to appointed counsel in cases in which that right is not otherwise provided for by constitution or 
statute.”). 
 92. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.352 (recognizing a right to court appointed counsel “except in 
civil matters in which the juvenile court is exercising jurisdiction pursuant to division (A)(2) . . . .”). 
 93. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.04 (West 2014) (defining “dependent child”); OHIO REV. 
CODE ANN. § 2151.03 (West 2014) (defining “neglected child”); and OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.031 
(West 2014) (defining “abused child”).   
 94. In re B.B., Nos. 13-13-36, 13-13-37, at *2. 
 95. See State ex rel. McQueen v. Cuyahoga Cty. Court of Common Pleas, Probate Div., 986 
N.E.2d 925, 930 (Ohio 2013) (comparing the plain language of the statutes to determine counsel should 
be provided). 
 96. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.01 (West 2014). 
 97. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.01(B). 
 98. Liming v. Damos, 979 N.E.2d 297, 309 (Ohio 2012) (O’Donnell, J., dissenting).  See also 
Lassiter v. Dept. of Soc. Servs. of Durham Cty., N.C., 452 U.S. 18, 59 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(“Meeting the Court on its own terms, Justice Blackmun demonstrates that the Mathews v. Eldridge 
analysis requires the appointment of counsel in this type of case.”). 
 99. In re M.E.H., No. 08CA4, 2008 WL 2766107, at *3 n.1 (Ohio 4th Dist. Ct. App. July 10, 
2008). 
 100. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 790 (1973) (“We thus find no justification for a new 
inflexible constitutional rule with respect to the requirement of counsel. We think, rather, that the 
decision as to the need for counsel must be made on a case-by-case basis . . . .”). 
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that an attorney represented Liming at the original hearing, and 
neither Liming nor his counsel objected to the magistrate’s decision 
or otherwise appealed the contempt order.
101
  According to the 
majority, Liming enjoyed the procedural safeguards akin to those 
outlined in Turner.
102
  The court further determined that the risk that 
the judicial procedure would lead to an erroneous decision was 
low.
103
   
In contrast, the parents in In re B.B. were forced to defend 
themselves during the custody hearing.
104
  They timely filed 
objections to the juvenile court judgment.
 105
  Because “[b]oth parents 
and children have interests to protect when threatened with Court-
ordered separation,”
106
 it is fundamentally unfair to require indigent 
parents to face a represented opponent in court when their parent-
child relationship is at stake.  Indeed, the ABA task force warned of 
“the impossibility of delivering justice rather than injustice in many 
cases unless both sides, not just those who can afford it, are 
represented by lawyers.”
107
  Moreover, “our adversary system of 
justice assumes that both sides are capable of participating.”
108
 
As noted by Ohio Supreme Court Chief Justice Maureen 
O’Connor, although the court “has been active in supporting litigants 
that are self-representing, . . . [t]his has an upside and a 
downside . . . . Sometimes [pro se litigants] do themselves more harm 
than good when they represent themselves, but they do not have 
access to representation or do not qualify for aid.”
109
   
While Ohio has rejected a categorical rule requiring the 
appointment of counsel for indigent parents in all custody 
 
 101. Liming, 979 N.E.2d at 306. 
 102. Id.  See also discussion of Turner v. Rogers, 131 S.Ct. 2507, 2520 (2011), supra notes 28 
and 29 and accompanying text. 
 103. Liming, 979 N.E.2d at 306. 
 104. In re B.B., Nos. 13-13-36, 13-13-37, at *3 (Ohio 3d Dist. Ct. App. Feb. 3, 2014), rev. denied, 
11 N.E.3d 286 (Ohio 2014).   
 105. Id. at 4.   
 106. In re A.G. B., 878 N.E.2d 49, 53 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 5, 2007).  
 107. AM. BAR ASS’N TASK FORCE, supra note 54, at 16.  Notably, the ABA filed an amicus brief 
in Lassiter v. Dept. of Soc. Servs. of Durham Cty., N.C., 452 U.S. 18 (1981) advocating that “in order to 
minimize [the risk of error] and ensure a fair hearing, procedural due process demands that counsel be 
made available to parents, and that if the parents are indigent, it be at public expense.”  Id. at 2, 3.  See 
ABA Brief as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Lassiter v. Dept. of Soc. Servs. of Durham Cty., 
N.C., 452 U.S. 18 (1981) (No. 79-6423), 1980 WL 340036, at *3–*4. 
 108. HOUSE CIVIL & COMMERCIAL LAW COMM., supra note 57, at Mar. 22, 1994 report.   
 109. Peck, supra note 56, at 47; see also Appellate Br., In re Marriage of King v. King, 174 P.3d 
659 (Wash. 2007) (No. 79978-4), 2006 WL 5109904, at *1 (highlighting statement made by indigent 
mother during custody removal proceeding: “I'm a good mother; I'm a lousy lawyer.”); Powell v. Ala., 
287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932) (“The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not 
comprehend the right to be heard by counsel.”). 
13
Brunett: When Loss of Legal Custody Is Like an Indeterminate Prison Senten
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2015
1436 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [VOL. 83 
proceedings,
110
 it at one time recognized this right.
111
  Although the 
right to counsel statute now reads that no entitlement to appointed 
counsel exists,
112
 court appointed representation arguably still 
remains available at a judge’s discretion.
113
   
B. Limited Jurisdiction: Interpretations and Misinterpretations by 
Ohio Courts 
While some interpretations of Ohio statutory law may exclude the 
appointment of counsel in cases where a child is not ward of the 
state,
114
 the Ohio Fourth District Court of Appeals’ holdings in In re 
T.C.K.
115
 and In re A.G.B.
116
 highlight the unsettled nature of Ohio 
juvenile courts’ appointments of counsel to indigent parties in so-
called private action custody cases. 
In In re T.C.K., the Fourth District found that “[n]either appellant 
nor the child ha[d] a right to appointed counsel in a private custody 
matter between a parent and a non-parent and in which the state [did] 
not seek a termination of parental rights.”
117
  The court documented 
that the county children services agency previously had placed 
T.C.K. in the paternal aunt’s legal custody,
118
 but that this case arose 
from the aunt’s custody petition.
119
  Nonetheless, the trial court 
appointed a guardian ad litem to represent the child’s best interests in 
response to the aunt’s private-party petition for legal custody.
120
 
In In re A.G.B., the father, as a private party actor, filed an 
emergency custody complaint against the child’s mother alleging that 
A.G.B. was an abused, neglected, and dependent child.
121
  Even 
 
 110. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.352, as amended. 
 111. See discussion of Asberry v. Payne, 693 N.E.2d 794, 798-99 (Ohio 1998), supra text 
accompanying notes 32 and 37. 
 112. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.352. 
 113. See HOUSE CIVIL & COMMERCIAL LAW COMM., H.R. CON. R. 38 COMM. REP. (Mar. 29, 
1994), available at 
http://www.rotundacollection.com/Hannah/Report_CommitteeReport.aspx?id=109&ps=true&HL=True 
(arguing that while there is no right to court appointed counsel in private cases . . . “the [proposed] rule 
does not preclude counsel, but gives judges discretion.”); see also State ex rel. McQueen v. Cuyahoga 
Cty. Court of Common Pleas, Probate Div., 986 N.E.2d 925, 930 (Ohio 2013) (finding the issue 
“susceptible of different interpretations.”). 
 114. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.23(A)(2). 
 115. No. 13CA3, 2013 WL 4477400 (Ohio 4th Dist. Ct. App. Aug. 12, 2013). 
 116. 878 N.E.2d 49 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 5, 2007). 
 117. No. 13CA3, 2013 WL 4477400, at *6.   
 118. Id. at *1, *2 (presumably pursuant to OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.353(A)(3) as outlined in 
S. 238, 126th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2006); see discussion infra, at notes 154 and 155).   
 119. In re T.C.K., No. 13CA3, 2013 WL 4477400, at *8. 
 120. Id. at *1, *6. 
 121. 878 N.E.2d 49, 51, 54 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 5, 2007) (noting that the father’s complaint was 
filed pursuant to OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.23(A)(1), the subsection purportedly reserved for filings 
14
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though the county children services agency did not initiate the 
proceedings, the magistrate appointed counsel to represent the 
mother,
122
 and, on remand, was required to appoint a guardian ad 
litem for the child.
123
  The mother’s failure to request appointment of 
a guardian ad litem did not waive the juvenile court’s mandatory duty 
to appoint one under statute.
124
  Judge Harsha “regretfully” concurred 
in the judgment, yet nonetheless agreed that the child was entitled to 
the services of guardian ad litem despite the mother’s belated 
request.
125
  According to Judge Harsha, “[w]ere we to decide that the 
mother couldn’t raise the child’s right, by whom and how would that 
interest gain protection?”
126
  Judge Abele dissented, noting that the 
“filing and presentation of the case did not involve the local public 
children services agency.”
127
  In his opinion, the statute should “not 
apply to ‘private’ custody disputes.”
128
 
Similar to the father in In re A.G.B., the great-grandparents in In re 
B.B. alleged neglect, abuse, and sexual abuse in their emergency 
petition and amended petition for custody.
129
  Pursuant to the Ohio 
statute concerning the appointment of guardians ad litem,
130
 a 
guardian shall be appointed to protect the interests of an “alleged 
abused or neglected child.”
131
  Yet the Third District reasoned that 
because the “case was not filed as a dependency, abuse, or neglect 
proceeding,”
132
 and because the trial court never adjudicated the 
children as abused, neglected, or dependent, this somehow precluded 
the court from appointing counsel.
133
  The juvenile court and Third 
District thus erred in myopically severing the method of filing from 
the statute governing appointment of guardians ad litem.
134
   
 
by children services agencies). 
 122. Id. at 51, 54.   
 123. Id. at 54. 
 124. Id. at 53. 
 125. Id. at 54 (Harsha, J., concurring). 
 126. Id.  But see In re T.C.K., No. 13CA3, 2013-WL-4477400, at *5 (Ohio 4th Dist Ct. App. Aug. 
12, 2013) (finding that mother “lacks standing to raise an error relating to the child’s wavier of 
counsel.”); In re B.B., Nos. 13-13-36, 13-13-37, at 8 n.3 (Ohio 3d Dist. Ct. App. Feb. 3, 2014), rev. 
denied, 11 N.E.3d 286 (Ohio 2014) (questioning the parents’ standing to argue against the trial court’s 
failure to appoint a guardian ad litem). 
 127. In re A.G.B., 878 N.E.2d at 54 (Abele, J., dissenting).  
 128. Id. at 55. 
 129. In re B.B., Ohio 3d Dist. Ct. App. at 2. 
 130. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.281(B)(1) (West 2014). 
 131. Id. (emphasis added); see also the third sentence of Ohio R. Juv. P. 4(A) (“When the 
complaint alleges that a child is an abused child, the court must appoint an attorney to represent the 
interests of the child.”) (emphasis added). 
 132. In re B.B., Nos. 13-13-36, 13-13-37, at *4 (emphasis added). 
 133. Id. at *8. 
 134. According to the simplified logic of the Third District, “In In re A.G.B., the father filed a 
complaint pursuant to R.C. 2151.27(A)(1) alleging that A.G.B. was an abused, neglected, and dependent 
15
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As reasoned by the Third District in In re B.B., “the trial court 
never invoked its jurisdiction pursuant to R.C. 2151.23(A)(1) to 
adjudicate B.B. and D.B. abused, neglected, or dependent children.  
Thus, the grant of custody to [the great-grandparents] was not based 
on a finding of abuse, neglect or dependency,”
135
 nor were the 
children wards of the state.
136
  Because the great-grandparents filed 
the complaint for legal custody alleging that the children’s parents 
were unfit parents, under the court’s strict interpretation of Ohio 
statutory law, this fell within an exception to the rule entitling 
indigent parties to appointed counsel.
137
 
Although the county children services agency did not initiate the 
custody action,
138
 this case, similar to In re A.G.B. and In re T.C.K., 
nonetheless concerned allegations of abuse and neglect.
139
  Because a 
parent has a “fundamental liberty interest . . . in the care, custody, 
and management of [his or her] child,”
140
 the ramifications of loss of 
custody apply “equally in the context of an abuse or neglect 
proceeding in which a parent may potentially lose custody of his or 
her child to a children services agency or to an individual.”
141
  An 
indigent parent’s fundamental right to appointed counsel should not 
hinge on distinguishing custody actions brought by private parties 
from those brought by children services agencies.   
Notably, the Ohio statute governing the filing of juvenile court 
complaints
142
 states that complaints may be brought by “any person 
having knowledge of a child who appears . . . to be [] unruly, abused, 
neglected, or dependent . . . .”
143
  It appears that the Third District 
conflated the statutory jurisdiction of the juvenile court
144
 with the 
statutory guidelines for filing a complaint.
145
  As a result, the Third 
District erroneously distinguished the facts and circumstances of In 
 
child.  Here, the [great-grandparents] filed a complaint for legal custody pursuant to R.C. 2151.27(A)(2) 
alleging that [the children’s parents] were unfit parents.”  In re B.B., Nos. 13-13-36, 13-13-37, at *8, *9 
(emphasis in original) (internal citations omitted).  Therefore, the court refused to appoint counsel for 
the parents or a guardian ad litem for the children.     
 135. In re B.B., Nos. 13-13-36, 13-13-37, at *6 (emphasis added). 
 136. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.23(A)(2). 
 137. In re B.B., Nos. 13-13-36, 13-13-37, at *7. 
 138. Id. at *2.  Frankly, this writer is surprised the State was not involved due to the nature of the 
allegations. 
 139. In re B.B., Nos. 13-13-36, 13-13-37, at *2.  See also In re A.G.B., 878 N.E.2d 49, 54 (Ohio 
Ct. App. Sept. 5, 2007). 
 140. In re A.G.B., 878 N.E.2d at 53 (citing Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982)). 
 141. Id. (emphasis added).   
 142. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.27 (West 2014). 
 143. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.27(A)(1) (emphasis added).  Moreover, the language of 
(A)(2) addresses habitual truancy, which is inapplicable here.   
 144. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.23(A)(1)–(2). 
 145. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.27(A)(1)–(2). 
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re A.G.B. and the principles of its holding from In re B.B.,
146
 and, at 
the very least, failed to appoint a guardian ad litem for the children.   
C. What is in a Name? When Legal Custody Converts to Permanent 
Custody for Unrepresented Parents in Custody Removal 
Hearings 
As recognized by Justice O’Neill, “It is undisputed that parents are 
appointed counsel in permanent-custody cases . . . It makes no sense 
to deny parents that same right in legal custody cases . . . In both 
cases, the parents’ fundamental right to raise their own children is 
being abrogated.”
147
  The Third District, however, emphasized that 
the great-grandparents “were not given permanent custody of B.B. 
and D.B., but rather a grant of legal custody.”
148
  The right to 
counsel, however, should not turn on the civil label attached.   
Permanent custody is defined as “a legal status that vests in a 
public children services agency or a private child placing agency, all 
parental rights, duties, and obligations . . . and divests the natural 
parents or adoptive parents of all parental rights, privileges, and 
obligations, including all residual rights and obligations.”
149
  On the 
other hand, legal custody is “a legal status that vests in the custodian 
the right to have physical care and control of the child . . . all subject 
to any residual parental rights, privileges, and responsibilities.”
150
 
“The important distinction” for the Third District was that “an 
award of legal custody does not divest parents of their residual 
parental rights, privileges, and responsibilities.”
151
  In contrast, a 
parent cannot regain custody of a child after a trial court has awarded 
permanent custody of that child to a public children services agency 
or a private child placing agency.  It is the permanent nature of this 
loss of a fundamental right that makes it appropriate to equate an 
award of permanent custody to the “death penalty in a criminal 
case.”
152
  Yet, read in conjunction with the statute governing the 
disposition of abused, neglected, or dependent children,
 153
 Ohio’s 
legislature intended for even legal custody to be permanent.   
 
 146. In re B.B., Nos. 13-13-36, 13-13-37, at *8 (Ohio 3d Dist. Ct. App. Feb. 3, 2014), rev. denied, 
11 N.E.3d 286 (Ohio 2014). 
 147. In re B.B., 11 N.E.3d 286 (Ohio 2014). 
 148. In re B.B., Nos. 13-13-36, 13-13-37, at *6.   
 149. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.011(B)(32) (West 2014) (emphasis added). 
 150. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.011(B)(21) (West 2014) (emphasis added). 
 151. In re B.B., Nos. 13-13-36, 13-13-37, at *6 (internal citations omitted).   
 152. In re B.C., 21 N.E.3d 308, 313 (Ohio 2014) (citing In re Smith, 601 N.E.2d 45, 55 (Ohio Ct. 
App. 1991)). 
 153. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.353(A)(3)(b) (West 2014). 
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Ohio Senate Bill 238, for example, specifically permitted a child 
protection agency to file a complaint requesting legal custody be 
granted to a person other than the person from whom the child is 
being removed.
154  
Moreover, the identified legal custodian must sign 
a statement of understanding “that legal custody of the child in 
question is intended to be permanent.”
155
  The legal distinction 
between permanent custody and legal custody, therefore, is 
“susceptible of different interpretations.”
156
   
Illustrating this point, the great-grandparents in In re B.B. 
requested termination of visitation altogether between the children 
and both parents, and the trial court ordered that the father have no 
contact with his children.
157
  Applying Justice Blackmun’s dissent in 
Lassiter, the great-grandparents’ “aim [thus was] not simply to 
influence the parent-child relationship, but to extinguish it.”
158
  In this 
circumstance, loss of even legal custody certainly resembles an 
indeterminate prison sentence.  An award of permanent custody to a 
children services agency, therefore, may not be the only type of 
custody award which—in effect—terminates parental rights.   
While the restraint placed upon one’s superior parental right 
theoretically is not as great as the severance of that right, when legal 
custody becomes a permanent placement—and when visitation rights 
are terminated as in In re B.B.—it is.  Moreover, because no child 
placement agency was involved in In re B.B., alternative procedural 
safeguards, described by the United States Supreme Court in 
Turner,
159





 arguably are absent.  For instance, no permanency 
planning guidelines for visitation or reunification existed, nor the 
requirement to appear back before the court for follow up or 
monitoring, nor were the best interests of the children reviewed by a 
 
 154. See S. 238, 126th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2006), available at 
http://archives.legislature.state.oh.us/BillText126/126_SB_238_EN_N.pdfhttp://archives.legislature.stat
e.oh.us/BillText126/126_SB_238_EN_N.pdf; OHIO LEGIS. SERV. COMM’N, REVISED FINAL ANALYSIS 
21 (Sep. 21, 2006), available at http://www.lsc.state.oh.us/analyses126/06-sb238-126.pdfhttp:// 
www.lsc.state.oh.us/analyses126/06-sb238-126.pdf; see also OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.353(A)(3). 
 155. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.353(A)(3)(b) (emphasis added); see also S. 238, 126th Gen. 
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2006).   
 156. State ex rel. McQueen v. Cuyahoga Cty. Court of Common Pleas, Probate Div., 986 N.E.2d 
925, 930 (Ohio 2013). 
 157. In re B.B., Nos. 13-13-36, 13-13-37, at *2, *3 (Ohio 3d Dist. Ct. App. Feb. 3, 2014), rev. 
denied, 11 N.E.3d 286 (Ohio 2014). 
 158. Lassiter v. Dept. of Soc. Servs. of Durham Cty., N.C., 452 U.S. 18, 39 (1981) (Blackmun, J., 
dissenting) (emphasis added). 
 159. See generally discussion of Turner v. Rogers, 131 S.Ct. 2507, 2520 (2011), supra notes 28 
and 29 and accompanying text. 
 160. See Liming v. Damos, 979 N.E.2d 297, 309 (Ohio 2012); supra text accompanying note 98. 
 161. See In re B.C., 21 N.E.3d 308, 312, 315 (Ohio 2014); supra text accompanying note 79. 
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Foster Care Review Board or investigated by a Court Appointed 
Special Advocate (CASA) volunteer.
162
   
Significantly, although the Turner Court did not find that the Due 
Process Clause guaranteed “the provision of counsel where the 
opposing parent or other custodian . . .  is not represented by 
counsel,”
163
 the great-grandparents in In re B.B., in contrast, filed 
their petition by and through counsel.
164
  Although a child support 
matter, the United States Supreme Court’s reasoning in Turner 
extends to In re B.B, because B.B.’s and D.B.’s parents faced a 
represented opponent in court and lost custody of their children.
165
  
The magistrate in In re B.B. should have balanced this inequity in 
favor of appointing counsel.   
According to the Third District, however, “at any time in the 
future, either parent may petition the trial court for a modification of 
custody.”
166
  Yet, the Ohio statute controlling custody modifications 
and children’s best interests
167
 effectually prohibits a court from 
returning custody to the parents in In re B.B. unless the parents can 
prove that the great-grandparents no longer can provide a safe, stable 
placement for B.B. and D.B.  The statute directs that a court “shall 
not modify” a prior custody decree unless it finds that “a change has 
occurred in the circumstances of the child [or] the child’s residential 
parent . . . and that the modification is necessary to serve the best 
interest of the child.”
168
  The great-grandparents are the residential 
parents of B.B. and D.B.  Thus, the standard for returning custody of 
the children to their natural parents, without the great-grandparents’ 
consent, requires more than B.B.’s and D.B.’s natural parents 
showing a change in their own ability and desire to care for and 
protect their children.
169
   
 
 162. This writer formerly worked as a juvenile court Family Services Officer, facilitated Foster 
Care Review Boards, and served as a CASA volunteer at the Davidson County Juvenile Court in 
Nashville, Tennessee.  She writes from the lens of her previous experience in these roles. 
 163. Turner, 131 S.Ct. at 2520 (emphasis added). 
 164. See Mem. Supp. Jurisdiction, supra note 13, at 2. 
 165. Id. 
 166. In re B.B., Nos. 13-13-36, 13-13-37, at *6 (Ohio 3d Dist. Ct. App. Feb. 3, 2014), review 
denied, 11 N.E.3d 286 (Ohio 2014) (referencing In re Hockstock, 781 N.E.2d 971, 979 (Ohio 2002)); 
see also In re Keylor, No. 04 MO 02, 2005 WL 775890, at *15 (Ohio 7th Dist. Ct. App. March 30, 
2005) (DeGenaro, J., dissenting) (opining that an award of legal custody to a non-parent simply “limits 
[a parent’s parental] rights until the parent can successfully demonstrate to a court that [he or she] 
should regain custody.”) (emphasis in original). 
 167. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3109.04 (West 2014). 
 168. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3109.04(E)(1)(a) (emphasis added).  
 169. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3109.04(E)(1)(a)(ii).  But see In re Keylor, No. 04 MO 02, 
2005 WL 775890, at *15 (Ohio 7th Dist. Ct. App. March 30, 2005) (DeGenaro, J., dissenting) (opining 
that an award of legal custody to a non-parent simply “limits [a parent’s parental] rights until the parent 
can successfully demonstrate to a court that [he or she] should regain custody.”). 
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Moreover, the court severed all visitation between the father and 
both children.
170
  Although B.B’s. and D.B.’s parents “may petition 
the trial court for a modification of custody,”
171
 under the 
circumstances—and in light of statutory directive
172
—reunification 
seems unlikely.  Indeed, the Supreme Court of Ohio has held that 
“the natural rights of a parent are not absolute, but are always subject 
to the ultimate welfare of the child . . . .”
173
 
While an award of legal custody textually may limit a parent’s 
rights
174
 until he or she can demonstrate to a court that custody 
should be returned, considering the high standard and difficulty of 
ever regaining custody,
175
 custody removal petitions—no matter how 
couched—should trigger a parent’s right to court appointed counsel.  
The distinction between legal custody and permanent custody, in this 
sense, is illusory.  In his dissent in Lassiter, Justice Stevens advances 
one step further and opines that “the reasons supporting the 
conclusion that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment entitles the defendant in a criminal case to 
representation by counsel apply with equal force to a case of this 
kind.  The issue is one of fundamental fairness, not of weighing the 




Ohio currently recognizes the right to counsel in civil custody 
cases, but no right to court appointed counsel.  Although the right to 
counsel statute limits an indigent party’s entitlement to court 
appointed representation,
177
 the statute’s wording does not foreclose 
case-by-case attorney appointments at the court’s discretion.
178
  
Because the Ohio Supreme Court has not decided the right to 
appointed counsel in civil custody suits since its 1998 decision in 
Asberry,
179
 which was superseded by statute in 2005,
180
 the issue 
 
 170. In re B.B., Nos. 13-13-36, 13-13-37, at *3. 
 171. Id. at *6 (emphasis added). 
 172. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3109.04(E)(1)(a). 
 173. In re B.C., 21 N.E.3d 308, 313 (Ohio 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted (citation 
omitted).   
 174. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.011(B)(21). 
 175. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3109.04(E)(1)(a); supra note 167 and accompanying text. 
 176. Lassiter v. Dept. of Soc. Servs. of Durham Cty., N.C., 452 U.S. 59-60 (1981) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting). 
 177. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § R.C. 2151.352. 
 178. See HOUSE CIVIL & COMMERCIAL LAW COMM., supra note 113 and accompanying text, at 
Mar. 29, 1994 report (arguing that while there is no right to court appointed counsel in private 
cases . . . “the [proposed] rule does not preclude counsel, but gives judges discretion.”) 
 179. 693 N.E.2d 794 (Ohio 1998), superseded by 2005 amendment to OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
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remains open to varying interpretations by Ohio’s lower courts.
181
   
As applied to In re B.B., although court appointed counsel may not 
have changed the outcome of the custody hearing,
182
 the United 
States and Ohio Supreme Courts have recognized that due process is 
“flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular 
situation demands.”
183
  The parents and children in In re B.B. lacked 
an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law to challenge the 
juvenile court’s refusal to appoint counsel.
184
  Specifically, the 
juvenile court’s no contact order terminated the father’s visitation 
with his children.
185
  This should have triggered the right to 
appointed counsel, or at the very least, a guardian ad litem for the 
children, to ensure that the alternative procedural safeguards 
recognized in Turner, Liming, and In re B.C. were satisfied.
186
  The 
Third District thus applied an overly exacting analysis of Ohio 
statutory law limiting the appointment of counsel in civil custody 
suits when refusing to recognize a right to court appointed 
representation for B.B., D.B., and their parents.  The court’s decision 
ignores more recent case law which champions balancing factors to 
determine a violation of fundamental fairness, and which likely 
would support court appointed representation for the parents and 
children in In re B.B., as well as other future parties similarly 
situated. 
Ohio’s highest court “sits to settle the law, not to settle cases,” and 
does not engage in an exercise in “‘error correction’ regarding the 
 
§ 2151.352.   
 180. See H.R. 66, 126th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2005) discussed at supra notes 42, 44, 
and accompanying text. 
 181. See discussion of State ex rel. McQueen v. Cuyahoga Cty. Court of Common Pleas, Probate 
Div., 986 N.E.2d 925, 930 (Ohio 2013), supra note 156 (finding that the issue was “susceptible of 
different interpretations” by different courts). 
 182. See Lassiter v. Dept. of Soc. Servs. of Durham Cty., N.C., 452 U.S. 18, 33 (1981) (holding 
that the failure to appoint counsel does not presumptively deny the parent of constitutional rights where 
the presence of counsel could not have made a determinative difference). 
 183. In re B.C., 21 N.E.3d 308, 312 (Ohio 2014) (citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 
(1972)). 
 184. See State ex rel. Asberry v. Payne, 693 N.E.2d 794, 798 (Ohio 1998), superseded by 2005 
amendment to OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.352 (finding that the grandmother “lacked an adequate 
remedy in the ordinary course of law to challenge [the juvenile court judge’s] refusal to appoint her 
counsel” in the custody proceeding); State ex rel. McQueen v. Cuyahoga Cty. Court of Common Pleas, 
Probate Div., 986 N.E.2d 925, 931 (Ohio 2013) (recognizing that appellant “lacked an adequate remedy 
in ordinary course of law to challenge the probate court’s refusal to appoint counsel for him.”).   
 185. In re B.B., Nos. 13-13-36, 13-13-37, at *3 (Ohio 3d Dist. Ct. App. Feb. 3, 2014), review 
denied, 11 N.E.3d 286 (Ohio 2014). 
 186. See generally discussion of Turner v. Rogers, 131 S.Ct. 2507, 2520 (2011), supra notes 28 
and 29; Liming v. Damos, 979 N.E.2d 297, 309 (Ohio 2012), supra note 98; and In re B.C., 21 N.E.3d 
308, 312 (Ohio 2014), supra note 79. 
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application of settled law to the facts of [a particular] case.”
187
  In 
addition to challenging the Third District’s flawed analysis in In re 
B.B., this Comment highlights the unsettled application the Ohio’s 
juvenile rules of court and statutory law controlling the appointment 
of counsel in private party custody complaints, especially those 
alleging dependency, abuse, and neglect.  This Comment further 
advocates that recent United States and Ohio Supreme Court 
decisions concerning the appointment of counsel in other civil 
contexts create a path for indigent litigants in private custody cases to 
receive an attorney paid for by public funds.  “If permanent custody 
is the family law equivalent of the death penalty in criminal 
cases[,and] legal custody is the equivalent of an indeterminate prison 
sentence,”
188
 what alternative procedural safeguards currently are in 
place for indigent Ohio parents in private action custody 
proceedings?    
 
 187. Baughman v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 727 N.E.2d 1265, 1276 (Ohio 2000) (Cook, J., 
concurring and citing Ohio Const. Art. IV, § 2). 
 188. In re Keylor, No. 04 MO 02, 2005 WL 775890, at *15 (Ohio 7th Dist. Ct. App. March 30, 
2005) (DeGenaro, J., dissenting). 
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